

Between Moscow and Rome: Struggle for the Greek Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine

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When Kiril Lakota, the central figure of the award-winning film based on Morris West's bestseller, *The Shoes of the Fisherman*, was released from the Soviet Gulag and came to Rome, he was elected pope. When Joseph Slipyi (1892-1984), archbishop of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and prototype of Lakota, was released from the Gulag by Nikita Khrushchev in 1963, he came to Rome to proclaim himself patriarch of Kiev and Halych.¹

The idea of a Kievan patriarchate under the jurisdiction of Rome first appeared in the 1580s, on the eve of the ecclesiastical union of the Kiev Orthodox metropolitanate with Rome.² The union was concluded

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1. According to the publisher, Morris L. West's book, *The Shoes of the Fisherman* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1963), was written between March 1961 and August 1962, before Archbishop Slipyi's release from Soviet imprisonment in January 1963. The name of the central figure of West's book, Kiril Lakota, is based on the name of Hryhorii Lakota (1883-1950), the Greek Catholic auxiliary bishop of Przemyśl (Peremyshl) who was imprisoned in 1946 and died in the Gulag. See Osyp Zinkevych and Rev. Taras R. Lonchyna, eds., *Martyrology of the Ukrainian Churches. Vol. 2: The Ukrainian Catholic Church. Documents, Materials, Christian Samvydav from Ukraine* (Toronto-Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1985), 105, 325-31.

On Slipyi's arrival in the West in 1963 and the reaction of the world press to his release from the Gulag, see Milena Rudnycka, *Nevydymy Styhmaty* (Rome-Munich-Philadelphia: Society for Promotion of the Patriarchal System in the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1971.) On Slipyi's activities, see Jaroslav Pelikan, *Confessor Between East and West: A Portrait of Ukrainian Cardinal Josyf Slipyj* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990).

2. On the history of the idea of the patriarchate in early modern Ukraine, see Oscar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest (1439-1596)*, 2nd ed. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 215-18; Jan Krajcar, "The Ruthenian Patriarchate: Some Remarks on the Project for Its Establishment in the 17th Century," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 30 (1964): 65-84; D. Tanczuk, "Questio patriarchatus Kioviensis tempore conaminum Unionis Ruthenorum

in Rome in 1595, and the Uniate Church, founded at its Council in Brest in 1596, later became known as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic or Ukrainian Catholic Church. Although the idea of a Greek Catholic patriarchate has existed since the seventeenth century, it has never been realized. The forcible liquidation of the Church by the Soviet authorities after World War II, which left approximately one million Ukrainian Catholics in the Western diaspora without their traditional religious center and their hierarchs without their titular territory, was a major setback for the idea of the patriarchate.³ Nevertheless, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a growing movement in the Ukrainian diaspora for the creation of a Catholic patriarchate.

In 1963, Joseph Slipyi raised the issue of the Ukrainian patriarchate in his speech at the Second Vatican Council and later built a strong movement in support of patriarchal status for the Church among his flock. A number of factors contributed to the success of Slipyi's propaganda. Firstly, the nationalistically minded Ukrainian diaspora wanted its dispersed eparchies to be united into one national Catholic Church. Secondly, Vatican II recognized the right of the Eastern Catholic Churches to preserve their distinct character, and the Ukrainian Catholic diaspora, with more than a million faithful, felt itself discriminated against without a patriarchate of its own when the significantly smaller Eastern Catholic Churches, such as the Coptic, Syrian, and Armenian, had their own patriarchates.⁴

(1582-1632)," *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni*, I (VII) (1949): 128-46; and Hryhor M. Luznycky, "The Quest for the Patriarchate in the Past of the Ukrainian Church," in *The Quest for an Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate*, eds. Victor J. Pospishil and Hryhor M. Luznycky (Philadelphia, Penn.: Ukrainian Publications, 1971), 32-43.

3. On the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities in 1945-1949, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Suppression of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Postwar Soviet Union and Poland," in *Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Union and the Soviet Union*, ed. Dennis J. Dunn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987), 97-119; Denis Dirscherl, "The Soviet Destruction of the Greek Catholic Church," *Journal of Church and State* 12 (Autumn 1970): 421-39; and Serhii Plokhyy, "In the Shadow of Yalta: International Politics and the Soviet Liquidation of the Greco-Catholic Church," *Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 35 (1994): 59-76.

4. On the issue of the patriarchate, see Victor J. Pospishil's articles, "An Autonomous Ukrainian Catholic Church," "Towards a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate," "In the Wake of a Rejection," and "A Summary View of the Problem of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Light of the Principles of Canon Law," in *The Quest for an Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate*, eds. Pospishil and Luznycky, 7-31, 43-74; Johannes Madey, *Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil und die Revision des Rechtes der Ostkirchen* (Rome: Bohosloviiia, 1978); J. Madey, *Le patriarchat ukrainien vers la perfection de l'état juridique actuel* (Rome: Pratsi Ukrainskoho Bohoslovskoho Tovarystva, 1971); George A. Maloney, S.J., "The Present Canonical Status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and Its Future," in *Archiepiscopal and Patriarchal Autonomy*, eds. Thomas E. Bird and Eva Piddubcheshen (New York: Fordham University, 1972), 44-56; and Meletius Michael Wojnar, "Proiekt konstytutsii Patriarkhatu Ukrainskoi Tserkvy," *Bohosloviiia* 34 (1970): 5-39.

Joseph Slipyi proclaimed himself patriarch of Kiev and Halych in 1974. Although he never achieved his ultimate goal, the recognition of the patriarchate by Rome, his devotion to the cause brought results.⁵ In 1980 John Paul II recognized the Synod of Ukrainian Bishops, created by Slipyi as part of the patriarchal structure, as a legitimate body. This move by the new pope provoked a strong negative reaction on the part of the Moscow patriarchate and not only threatened the ecumenical dialogue that the Vatican was trying to establish with Moscow, but also made Vatican-Soviet relations even more difficult and unpredictable.⁶

THE CHALLENGE OF THE NATIONAL IDEA

The restoration of the independent Ukrainian state in 1991 gave an impulse both to the patriarchal movement among Greek Catholics and to the autocephalous movement in the Orthodox Church. Both of these movements had been inspired by the development of Ukrainian national ideology throughout the twentieth century. Thus, the achievement of the main goal of the national movement—the creation of an independent state—inevitably brought to the Church's agenda the task of achieving maximum independence in Church affairs as well. In the case of the Orthodox Church such independence could be accomplished by the granting of autocephaly for the Church; in the case of the Catholic Church, so long as there could not be a separate Catholic Church beyond the jurisdiction of Rome, the creation of an Eastern-rite Catholic patriarchate in Ukraine has been viewed as a possible solution.

At the time of the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities in 1945-46, the Church was closely linked to the Ukrainian national movement. The legalization of the Church in 1989 was also closely connected to the acceleration of the Ukrainian national movement during the perestroika years. Nevertheless, the national character of the Greek Catholic Church very soon was severely challenged by its newly emerged rival—the Ukrainian Autocephalous Or-

5. On Cardinal Slipyi's struggle for the recognition of the patriarchate, see Jaroslav Pelikan, *Confessor Between East and West*, 190-215; and Russel P. Morozuk, *Politics of a Union* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1983).

6. On the role of the "Uniate" factor in Vatican-Moscow relations, see Hahsjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917-1979* (Athens, Oh.: Ohio University Press, 1981); Russel P. Morozuk, *Politicized Ecumenism: Rome, Moscow and the Ukrainian Church* (Montreal: Virginia Nixon, 1984); Alexis U. Floridi, S.J., "The Role of Ukraine in Recent Soviet-Vatican Diplomacy," in *Archiepiscopal and Patriarchal Autonomy*, eds. Bird and Pidubcheshen, 61-70; Ivan Hvat, *The Catacomb Church and Pope John Paul II* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1985); and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* 39 (November-December 1990): 1-19.

thodox Church. The adherents of the latter emphasized the fact of the complete independence of their Church at a time when, by contrast, Greek Catholics were dependent on decisions coming from Rome. They also argued that the 1596 Union of Brest, of which the Greek Catholic Church was the major product, was introduced in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by force and that the highly praised Zaporozhian Cossacks defended Orthodoxy against a Uniate offensive. The proclamation of patriarchal status for the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in June 1990 undermined the Ukrainian Catholic Church's claim to be the only truly national church. The Church has since found itself on the defensive and was forced to accelerate its struggle for the recognition of its patriarchal status.

The struggle for the Greek Catholic patriarchate in Ukraine has been significantly influenced by three major factors: the development of the patriarchal movement within the Church, the Vatican's attitude toward the idea of a Ukrainian patriarchate and, last but not least, the state's policy toward Greek Catholics in an independent Ukraine.

1992 LVIV SYNOD

The legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine that took place in late 1989 with significant support from the Vatican, especially Pope John Paul II personally, strengthened the pro-patriarchal faction within the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The main canonical obstacle in the way to the Greek Catholic patriarchate—the absence of any titular territory under the jurisdiction of the patriarch—ceased to exist with the restoration of Church structures in Ukraine.

The patriotic sentiments of the Church's adherents in Ukraine, who used to see the Church as the vehicle of Ukrainian national ideology, and who desired to strengthen the Church's national image, found legitimacy in the patriarchal movement, born and shaped in the Ukrainian diaspora. Two currents, one coming from Ukraine, another from abroad, met one another in the desire to create the patriarchal structures of the Greek Catholic Church.

In May 1992 the unique opportunity to demonstrate the strength of the patriarchal movement came with the convening of the Synod of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. For the first time it was convoked in Ukraine and took place in Lviv, the titular city of the Metropolitan, in May 1992. The synod, attended by the Vatican's first nuncio in Ukraine, Archbishop Antonio Franco, created the main bodies of the patriarchate, including the Patriarchal Curia and the Permanent Synod

of Bishops, and asked the Vatican not so much to create the patriarchate as to recognize the patriarchal structures that already existed.⁷

Except for the question of the patriarchate, there were other decisions of the synod that were of special importance for the Church. The synod requested to put under the jurisdiction of the Greek Catholic patriarch the Peremyshl (Przemyśl) eparchy in Poland and to subordinate to the Lviv see the Greek Catholic eparchy of Transcarpathia. There were also propositions to create Greek Catholic eparchies in eastern Ukraine and in Russia. All of the synod's requests had never been made public, but the program of the patriarchal faction of the Church has been expressed by its members on a number of occasions. One of them, Rev. Dr. Mykhailo Dymyd, believes that the Kiev-Halych patriarchate should be comprised of the four metropolies—those of Kiev, Lviv, Peremyshl and Uzhhorod—and seven exarchates—three in Ukraine, Kharkiv, Odessa, Donetsk, and four beyond the Ukrainian borders, within the territory of the former USSR, the exarchates of Belarus, Russia, Siberia and Asia.⁸ The synod also presented candidates for consecration as bishops. All requests and propositions were sent to Rome for approval.⁹

Rome's reluctance to provide answers to the requests of the synod provoked a negative reaction on the part of the Church and forced its head, Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Liubachivsky, to make a special statement on the matter. In the "Appeal to the Greek Catholics of Ukraine and the Settlements" of 15 February 1993, he called his flock to pray that the decisions of the Synod of Lviv, and especially one on the Kiev-Halych patriarchate, be promulgated and confirmed by the Roman authorities. He also criticized those who considered the very existence of the Greek Catholic Church to be the obstacle toward improving Orthodox-Catholic relations. In that manner he expressed his deep concern over the latest developments in Vatican Eastern policy and attacked those influential circles within the Vatican that wanted to victimize the Ukrainian Catholic Church in favor of Roman Catholicism. He complained that the Greek Catholic Church had been put in this unfavorable position when it had to prove its right to create eparchies in Ukraine, when the Roman Catholics did not have problems of that kind at all. He stressed that the jurisdiction of the Church had to be expanded not only to the territory of Transcarpathia and eastern Ukraine,

7. Press releases, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 27 May and 2 June 1992.

8. Mykhailo Dymyd, "Hreko-katolyky: stanovlennia pislia katakomb," *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 November 1992.

9. Press release, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 27 May 1992.

but far beyond the state borders of Ukraine—to all the territories of the former USSR, wherever the Ukrainian Catholics had settled.¹⁰

There is little doubt that Myroslav Ivan Liubachivsky, who has been generally known for his loyalty to the Vatican and personally to the pope, was forced to express his dissatisfaction with the Vatican's policy of delay by the growing discontent of his flock. Two scandals that shocked the Church in early 1993 have shown how high the tension within the Church has been. One of these scandals took place in Ukraine and was related to the leader of the clandestine Greek Catholic Church, Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk, and the other occurred abroad, in Canada, caused by the Vatican's appointment of the apostolic administrator for the Toronto eparchy.

DISCONTENT IN UKRAINE

The scandal that involved Archbishop Sterniuk started in January 1993, when the newspaper *News from Ukraine* published an article by Nestor Hodovany-Stone, a former Greek Catholic priest, who eventually converted to Orthodoxy. The article, entitled "A Prisoner of Mount St. George," claimed that the former leader of the clandestine church in Ukraine and martyr for the faith, Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk, had been under the surveillance of the people who came from Rome together with Cardinal Liubachivsky and in reality was a prisoner of the Vatican in the metropolitan's residence at St. George's Hill in Lviv. Reportedly Sterniuk had dictated to the author of the article a statement to the Ukrainian people in which he expressed his desire for unity with the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The statement said: "If my brother Orthodox Metropolitans in Kiev unite, I would be willing to unite with them to form one Ukrainian Church of Christ under one pastor. By this I understand not a Uniate Church, but a Unity of Churches in one general, Holy, Apostolic Orthodox Church."¹¹ Though the unity with the Orthodox Church in Ukraine for a long period of time is being proclaimed as an ultimate goal of the Greek Catholic Church by its leadership, the reaction on the part of the Church authorities was very sharp. The chancellor of the Lviv archeparchy, Rev. Ivan Datsko, met with journalists to make public the new statement of Metropolitan Sterniuk in which he denied the fact that he ever was "the prisoner of Mount St. George" and confirmed his loyalty to Cardinal Liubachivsky and the pope.¹²

10. *Svoboda*, 2 April 1992.

11. Fr. Nestor Hodovany-Stone, "A Prisoner of Mount St. George," *News from Ukraine*, January 1993.

12. Yaroslav Melnychuk, "Ya vnov zaiavliaiu o svoiei vernosti Ioannu Pavlu II, Pape Rimskomu," *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 February 1993.

It was symptomatic that Metropolitan Sterniuk did not take part in the press conference and never denied a single word of his original statement. Even more, in his statement, sent to the editor of *News from Ukraine*, Metropolitan Sterniuk quoted the letter of 1942 by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the unchallenged authority to all Greek Catholics, in which he stated that the Kievan metropolitan should be elected from among the Autocephalous Orthodox bishops or priests and in the case of his unity with the Universal Church the Greek Catholics should recognize his authority.¹³

Due to the fact that the word *Orthodox* had been used to define the Catholic Church in the first six centuries after Christ and both churches define themselves as catholic (universal) and orthodox (true), the usage of the words *Union*, *Unity*, *Universal*, *Catholic*, and *Orthodox* in different combinations gives to the Greek Catholic clergy the possibility to preserve their formal loyalty to the Vatican and at the same time to rebel against its authority.

The publication of Sterniuk's proclamation provoked a strong reaction on the part of the Church authorities first due chiefly to the growing tensions between different factions within the Church. It was not the first time that the archbishop created problems for the Church authorities and the Vatican. It happened the first time in 1990, during the proceedings of the quadri-partite commission of Vatican, Moscow, Ukrainian Orthodox, and Greek Catholic representatives in Lviv. At that time Sterniuk left one of the proceedings of the commission in protest against attempts of the Vatican representatives to make a deal with Moscow at the expense of the Greek Catholic Church.

For many Church members Archbishop Sterniuk serves as a symbol of the most radically oriented part of the Church—of clandestine bishops, priests, and monks, for whom their struggle for the legalization of the Church under Soviet rule was closely connected to the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine, and who see in the patriarchal structure of the Church the fulfillment of not only their religious but also their national aspirations. This position has substantial support among politically active laymen. It was their protests that enabled the Vatican to force Sterniuk to resign in 1991, and it was these activists who in May 1992, during the proceedings of the Church synod, issued and distrib-

13. *Visti z Ukrainy*, 25 February - 3 March 1993. On the life and activities of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, see Cyrille Korolevskij, *Métropolite André Szeptyckyj 1865-1944* (Rome, 1964); and *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptytsky*, ed. Paul R. Magosci with the assistance of Andrii Krawchuk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989).

uted leaflets all over Lviv with the slogan *Our Patriarch is Volodymyr Sterniuk*.¹⁴

By the beginning of 1993, the Greek Catholic clergy in Ukraine had been composed of approximately five hundred clergymen who operated in the underground before 1990, four hundred priests who converted from Orthodoxy after the legalization of the Church, and forty individuals who came from the diaspora.¹⁵ The latter have occupied the leading positions in the government of the Church, as well as dominated its scholarly system and kept all links with the Vatican in their hands. Former clandestine priests who did not receive the proper theological education and have been extremely nationalistic in their orientation often come in conflict with both clergy sent from abroad and former Orthodox priests.

During the proceedings of the Second Church Synod, held in Lviv in February 1994, tensions mounted between the diaspora clergy, which did not want to accept Ukrainian citizenship, and the local priests. A group of Greek Catholic faithful demonstrated near the walls of St. George's Cathedral where the synod was taking place, protesting against the control of Church affairs by foreigners. One of their slogans was: "Lviv is for Galicians, not for overseas dealers."¹⁶

REBELLION IN THE DIASPORA

The pressure on the Church leadership in matters of the patriarchal status for the Church has mounted with events outside of Ukraine—in Canada, where the priests and laymen of the Toronto eparchy have expressed strong protest against the Vatican's interference in the affairs of the eparchy. In Toronto, Rome forcibly introduced its law on the retirement of Catholic bishops who reached seventy-five years of age. As far as the Greek Catholic Church was concerned, this law affected, first of all, the Australian exarchate, the Winnipeg metropol, and the Toronto eparchy in Canada. In Winnipeg and Melbourne the replacement of the old bishops took place almost smoothly, but this was not the case in Toronto, where the eparchial bishop, Isidore Borecky, refused to resign. His stand was supported by the majority of the eparchial clergy and lay activists. Borecky and his eparchy have been known for decades as a stronghold of the patriarchal movement, and

14. Press release, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 27 May 1992.

15. Rev. Ivan Datsko, "Suchasnyi stan Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy," *Ukrainska Dumka*, 4 February 1993.

16. See Kost Chavaga, "Synod UHKTs," *Shliakh peremohy*, 6 March 1994; Klymentyna Darmohrai, "Druhyi synod u Lvovi vidbuvsia u nezatyshnii obstanovtsi," *Ukraina i svit*, 2-8 March 1994.

the bishop was also a champion of the preservation of Eastern traditions in his eparchy and performed ordinations of married men to the priesthood.¹⁷

The Lviv 1992 Synod, taking into account the law on retirement, asked the Vatican to appoint an auxiliary bishop to help Borecky in his eparchy, but the Vatican had appointed on 29 December 1992 an apostolic administrator. The wave of discontent mounted partly because of the personality of Rome's appointee, Rev. Roman Danyliak, who was known for his negative attitude toward the patriarchal movement. "The person who has been named to this appointment, moreover, is one who is widely regarded within the Ukrainian Catholic community as one who himself does not respect the integrity and particularity of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church"—stressed a May 1992 statement by the *Etobicoke Group Coalition of Concerned Canadian Catholics*.¹⁸ The tensions in the eparchy appeared to be so high that Rome was forced to send to Toronto Bishop Michael Hrynchyshyn, the exarch of the Ukrainian Catholics in France and Benelux, to help implement the Vatican's will in the eparchy.¹⁹ Thus, the Vatican's move against the well known partisan of the patriarchal status for the Ukrainian Catholic Church reached an opposite result and intensified the whole movement. Not only the adherents of the patriarchate in Canada but also the Ukrainian Patriarchal Society in the USA came forward with their protests against the Vatican policy. Angry anti-Vatican articles and statements appeared in the Ukrainian Press of North America. "It's time to consider an independent Ukrainian Church" stated one of the letters quoted in the editorial of *The Ukrainian Weekly*, the most respected English-language Ukrainian periodical in the USA.²⁰

The crisis within the Toronto eparchy deteriorated with a rumor that a decision had been made by the Vatican authorities to limit the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to three Galician oblasts: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil; to elevate the Mukachiv eparchy to the status of metropolis and to put it under the direct juris-

17. Andriy Wynnyckyj, "Furor Erupts in Toronto Eparchy as Rome Makes Move Against Bishop," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 31 January 1993.

18. Press release, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 5 May 1993.

19. See Andriy Wynnyckyj's interviews with Bishop Michael Hrynchyshyn: "Bishop Hrynchyshyn Speaks on the Controversy in Toronto," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 4 April 1993; and "Bishop Hrynchyshyn on Dangers Facing Ukrainian Catholic Church," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11 April 1993.

20. Editorial, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church Must Listen to Its Own Voice," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 7 March 1993; see also article by Myron Kuropas, the newspaper's columnist and former aide to USA President Gerald Ford, "Rome Just Doesn't Get It," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 14 March 1993.

diction of Rome; to put the Greek Catholic parishes beyond the borders of Galicia under the jurisdiction of Roman-Catholic bishops; and finally, to prohibit the ordination of married clergy.²¹

In September 1993 the *New Catholic Times* informed its readers that Isidore Borecky had visited the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I. The patriarch reportedly supported the cause of the Greek Catholic patriarchate and promised to raise the issue of Borecky's removal from the Toronto eparchy in his talks with the pope.²² The patriarch's desire "to be much closer to the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Greek Catholics in Ukraine," allegedly expressed by him during the meeting with Borecky, contained a potential threat to both Moscow and Rome. In fact, Borecky managed to bring a new actor on the scene. The patriarchate of Constantinople has been involved in centuries-long conflict with Moscow for jurisdiction over the Kiev metropolitanate and leadership of the entire Orthodox world.²³

VATICAN POLITICS

In May 1991, on his trip to the USA, Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk spoke about the consecration of the Greek Catholic bishops for Belarus and Russia.²⁴ Very soon, however, the initial optimism of the leader of the clandestine Church made way for deep concern over

21. For the character of the rumors, see Andriy Wynnickyj's interviews with Bishop Michael Hrynchyshyn in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 4, 11 April 1993, and the appeal of the Ukrainian Patriarchal Society in the USA in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 21 March 1993.

22. See Louise Slobodian, "Ukrainian Catholic Bishop Brings Toronto Struggle to Istanbul," *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, November 1993.

23. In his concluding remarks at the meeting, the patriarch reportedly said, "I wish you to always remember if you wish to return to the Church from whence you came, you will always be welcome and if you wish to remain where you are, we wish to be your good friends, as we respect and love you" (Louise Slobodian, "Ukrainian Catholic Bishop").

On the issue of the Constantinople-Moscow rivalry over the Kievan metropolitanate, see N. Chubaty, "Moscow and the Ukrainian Church after 1654," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 10 (1954): 60-71; S. Ternovskii, "Issledovanie o podchinenii Kievskoi mitropolii Moskovskomu patriarkhatu," *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Kiev: Vremennaia komissia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, 1872), 1: 5: 1-172; H. Udod, *Pryiednannia Ukrainskoi Tserkvy do Moskovskoho patriarkhatu 1686 roku* (Winnipeg, 1972); M. Zazykin, *Autokefalia i zasady jej zastosowania* (Warsaw, 1931); Suzanne Gwen Hruby, Leslie Laszlo, and Stephan K. Pawlowitch, "Minor Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe," in *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 321-30.

The issue of the Toronto eparchy was discussed at the Church synod held in Lviv in February 1994. Reportedly, the synod recommended that Bishop Borecky resign and Bishop Danyliak be moved to another eparchy. It seems that both bishops ignored these recommendations. See Klymentyna Darmohrai, "Druhyi synod u Lvovi vidbuvsia u nezatyshnii obstanovtsi," *Ukraina i svit*, 2-8 March 1994.

24. Roma Hadzevych, "Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk Describes Legal Status of Ukrainian Catholic Church," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 May 1991.

the future of Ukrainian Catholic Church. For Russia and other former Soviet republics, the pope ordained not Greek Catholic but Roman Catholic bishops. The same had happened with central and eastern Ukraine. The Greek Catholic parishes in neighboring Poland remained under the jurisdiction of the primate of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Also, the question of subordination of the Greek Catholic eparchy in Transcarpathia to the Lviv metropolitan see has remained unresolved.

Many of the current problems in the relations between the Vatican and Ukrainian Catholics have their origins in previous conflicts and misunderstandings between the two sides that date back to the 1960s and the 1970s. Today, as before, the issues of the recognition of Ukrainian Catholic patriarchate and preservation of the Eastern traditions of the Ukrainian Catholic Church largely depend on the provisions of Vatican policy toward Moscow.²⁵ While the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991 changed a lot in world politics, it brought little, if any, change to the Vatican's approach toward the problems of ecumenical dialogue. It has been understood in the Vatican that Ukraine is no longer a part of the USSR and issues that are of vital importance for the Catholic Churches in Ukraine have to be decided not in Moscow but in Kiev. At the same time, there has been little understanding of the fact that the Moscow patriarchate has lost almost all of its parishes in western Ukraine and has been preoccupied more with the Orthodox autocephaly in all of Ukraine than with the threat of the Uniate offensive in Galicia.

Even before the formal legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, in the course of negotiations between the representatives of the Vatican and Moscow patriarchate in January 1989, both sides agreed that the union could not be considered an appropriate form of Christian unity and that they should make way for the ecumenical dialogue between the two Churches.²⁶ This approach has been promoted for a long time by the Pontifical Council for Christian Unity and probably it was not absolutely accidental that the Vatican's delegation on the negotiations in Moscow was comprised mostly of the representatives of the council.²⁷

25. See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and Greek Catholics," *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 143-54.

26. *Pravoslavnyi visnyk* 4 (1990): 13-16.

27. For the composition of the Vatican's delegation to Moscow, see *ibid.*, 13. On the Greek Catholic reaction on the activity of the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue Between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Church, see Rev. Peter Galadza, "Good News from Balamand," *Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 34 (1993): 352-54.

The restoration of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine has caused serious problems to Vatican relations with Moscow. There is little doubt that the latter agreed to the legalization of the Greek Catholics and mutual deliberations with the Vatican only under pressure from civil authorities in the Gorbachev administration. Being forced to pursue the main provisions of the governmental policy toward the Greek Catholics, the Moscow patriarchate struck back with the accusation that the Vatican was using force and practicing proselytism in Ukraine. The "corporate Union" of which the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church had been the main product, was viewed by the Orthodox leaders as the major threat to Orthodoxy on the territory of the former USSR.

Facing the deterioration of Orthodox-Catholic relations, some influential Catholic politicians from the Council for the Promotion of Church Unity had accused Ukrainian Catholics of causing problems in the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue and made the whole atmosphere in the Vatican very unfavorable for the Greek Catholics. In September 1991, after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence, the prefect of the Pope's Council for Church Union, Cardinal Cassidy, reportedly stated that the emergence of an independent Ukraine would threaten the ecumenical dialogue.²⁸ The Vatican was the 103rd state to recognize the independence of Ukraine.

The Moscow patriarchate managed to mobilize the world Orthodox community, including Eastern patriarchs, in its action against the Vatican. The ordination of the Roman Catholic bishops for the bishoprics in Russia brought the ecumenical dialogue between Moscow and the Vatican to the brink of collapse. The Moscow patriarchate claims as Orthodox believers almost all the Russian population in the former Soviet Union and does not want any significant presence of the Catholic Church there.

Under these circumstances, the leaders of the Greek Catholic Church are placing their hopes more and more on the personal support of the pope. In April 1993, Cardinal Liubachivsky, in his statement on the intention to build the patriarchal cathedral in Kiev, asserted: "I remind you all that the Holy Father, John Paul II Pope of Rome, himself stated, in the presence of the 28 bishops of our Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 'I no longer see any obstacle to the proclamation of a Patriarchate'."²⁹ The same confidence in the pope's support was ex-

28. For the Ukrainian reaction on the Cardinal's statement, see *Svoboda*, 5 November 1991.

29. For the Ukrainian text of the statement, see *Novyi shliakh*, 15 May 1993; for the English translation see Press Release, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 6 May 1993.

pressed by the Vatican's emissary to the Toronto eparchy, Bishop Michael Hrynchyshyn, who stated in an interview with the correspondent of *The Ukrainian Weekly*: "The Pope has repeatedly come out in our defence—many times. I'm sure he hasn't changed his mind. There might have been some statements made, but that is certainly not what the Holy Father thinks." According to Hrynchyshyn, the pope has been inclined to extend the power of the Lviv metropolitan beyond the borders of Ukraine, so that he could exercise the same power in Ukraine and over the eparchies of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in North and South America, Europe, and Australia.³⁰

The interdicasterial Commission for the Church in Eastern Europe, created by the pope on 15 January 1993 to coordinate Catholic activities in that part of the world, was also charged with coordination of the activities of the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic Churches in Ukraine. According to the Rev. Dr. Andriy Chirovsky, director of the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky Institute of Eastern Christian Studies at St. Paul University in Ottawa, there have been three main tendencies in the Vatican policy toward the Greek Catholic Church. The first of them is connected to the desire of certain circles in Rome to support the Church, highly respected for its struggle for survival under the communist regime. Two other tendencies are linked to the activity of two groups within Vatican leadership: "ecumenists" and "centralists." Both of the groups share a hostile attitude toward the idea of a Ukrainian patriarchate. The "ecumenists" are mainly preoccupied with the dialogue with Moscow, and "centralists" oppose any move toward the decentralization of world Catholicism. Those forces, according to Rev. Dr. Chirovsky, do not want to take into account theological and historical arguments of the proponents of a Ukrainian patriarchate that are based on the idea of the ancient tradition of Kievan Church that has been commonly viewed as an intermediary between East and West.³¹

There can be little doubt that the Vatican and the proponents of the Ukrainian patriarchate, though building their respective arguments on the decisions of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, see the legacy of the council from a different perspective.

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

The re-emergence of the Ukrainian state has created a new environment for the activity of the Greek Catholic Church. The main goals of state policy toward the Greek Catholics have been made public on a number of occasions by government officials both in Lviv and Kiev. In

30. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11 April 1993.

31. Based on the author's interview with Rev. Dr. Andrii Chirovsky of 4 June 1993.

May 1992, in his statement to the Synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Mykola Horyn, the head of the Lviv Regional Council, strongly supported the idea of the Greek Catholic patriarchate:

Today's synod is being held in circumstances that greatly differ from all the situations in the long history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. For the first time it is being held in an independent state. And therefore the question of a Patriarchate and Patriarch is immensely important as a certain symbol of an independent country, and as the way to ecumenism among all Ukrainian Christians.³²

Horyn's statement reflected the position of the local authorities of Galicia and lay Greek Catholic intelligentsia that were extremely active in the fight for Ukrainian independence.³³

Kiev's official approach to the problems of the Greek Catholic Church was expressed for the first time in August 1992 by none other than President Leonid Kravchuk. In his speech on the occasion of the transfer of the remains of Patriarch Josyf Slipyj from Rome to Lviv, President Kravchuk called for the unity of the Ukrainian people of all Christian confessions. He did not address the issue of the patriarchate but stressed that in the independent state there should be a church free from foreign intervention, and severely criticized attempts by foreign religious centers to interfere in the religious life of Ukraine.³⁴

Though President Kravchuk's statement came at a time of severe crisis in Kiev-Moscow relations over the issue of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, there were no signals sent out that the general approach to the problem of church-state relations did not relate to the Greek Catholic Church. Later, one of the officials of the Church even complained that such an approach could create certain problems for the Church.³⁵ Partly responding to such concerns, Leonid Kravchuk mentioned in his 1993 Easter greetings to the Christians of Ukraine that in Ukraine there was no such thing as churches that are "ours" or "not ours" (i.e. national or foreign) and that the government had been treating all of the confessions equally.³⁶

32. Press release, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 27 May 1992.

33. Mykola Horyn comes from a Galician family whose members were active in the dissident movement in the 1960s-1980s. His brothers Bohdan, a scholar of art and literature, and Mykhailo, a psychologist and current head of the Ukrainian Republican party, were imprisoned by the Soviet authorities on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." See their short biographies in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 2: 229.

34. "Vystup Prezydenta Ukrainy Leonida Kravchuka na sviatochnii akademii u pamiat Patriarkha Iosypa kardynala Slipoho," *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 September 1992.

35. Rev. Ivan Datsko, "Suchasnyi stan Ukrainiskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy," *Ukrainska Dumka*, 4 February 1993.

36. *Ukrainske slovo*, 16 April 1993.

In fact there are two levels in the decision-making process toward the problems of church-state relations in Ukraine. If the central authorities, being generally supportive for the national movements within all of the nation's churches, declare their support also to the Greek Catholics, on the local level there is no unity in the governmental policy toward Ukrainian Catholics. Authorities in Galicia, the stronghold of the Church, are definitely pro-Greek Catholic, when the local administrations in central and eastern Ukraine grant their support to the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, either of the Kiev or Moscow patriarchates.

Thus the negative attitude toward the Greek Catholic Church was demonstrated by the local authorities in Kiev. There the Church had to give up its attempts to obtain from the state one of the church buildings in the central part of the city and announced its plans to build the cathedral on its own. The lack of understanding between the city authorities and the Church caused two Western ambassadors to Ukraine in 1992—the USA's Roman Popadiuk and Canada's Charge de affaires Nestor Gayovsky, both Ukrainian Catholics—to participate in the Sunday services of the local Greek Catholic community in the front of the closed church.³⁷

Despite every effort of Church leaders and activists to influence the central authorities in Kiev to come out in defense of the Greek Catholic Church in its conflict with the Vatican and to support the idea of the Greek Catholic patriarchate, President Kravchuk never intervened with the Vatican in this matter. In fact, the Greek Catholic Church was left on its own in its struggle with the Vatican. The state never gave the same degree of support to the patriarchate that it did to the cause of Orthodox autocephaly when President Kravchuk wrote in the support of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the patriarchs of Moscow and Constantinople.³⁸

The main goals of government policy toward the Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian-Vatican relations were formulated by President Leonid Kuchma during his meeting with the papal nuncio, Archbishop Antonio Franco, in early January 1995. Kuchma reportedly told the nuncio: "We would like help from the Vatican in integrating into Europe . . . [and] we're interested in help from the Vatican to integrate

37. Myroslav Ivan kardynal Liubachivsky, "Za suttiu—vselenska, za formoiu—natsionalna," *Kultura i zhyttia*, 15 August 1992; Myroslav Levytskyi, "Svitlo i tyni mizhkonfesiinoho spivisnuvannia," *Nashe slovo*, 18 April 1993.

38. On the government policy toward Orthodox church in Ukraine, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek Catholics," in *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 143-54.

churches in Ukraine.”³⁹ On 2 May 1995 Kuchma visited the pope in the Vatican and discussed with him the prospects for the opening of a Ukrainian embassy at the Vatican, return of former Greek Catholic property confiscated by the state in 1939-1946, and the Vatican’s support for Ukraine in its efforts to join the Council of Europe. Both sides agreed that the pope’s visit to Ukraine in the near future would harm Orthodox-Catholic relations in the country.⁴⁰

It appeared that the government once again left the Greek Catholic Church to sort out its relations with the Vatican on its own, as it was more preoccupied with securing the pope’s support in the international arena than with the fate of the Greek Catholic Church in central and eastern Ukraine. The Vatican, for its part, appeared interested only in the issue of the return of former Greek Catholic property in Galicia.

Both Rome and Kiev demonstrated little if any support for Lviv’s attempts to establish a patriarchate. Nevertheless, in view of the main provisions of state religious policy, the Vatican’s efforts to limit the territory under the jurisdiction of the Lviv see may come into conflict with the interests of the state. Certainly there are some aspects of current Vatican-Lviv relations that are of special concern to independent Ukraine. The first of them relates to the jurisdiction of the Mukachiv bishopric in Transcarpathia and touches on the issue of the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state; the second to the jurisdiction of the Przemyśl (Peremyshl) Greek Catholic eparchy in Poland, which affects the development of Ukrainian-Polish relations.

“OUR CAPITAL CITY OF KIEV”

On 15 February 1993, shortly after the creation by the pope in January 1993 of the interdicasterial Commission for the Church in Eastern Europe, Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Liubachivsky issued a statement in which he recognized the problems that exist in the Vatican-Ukrainian relations over the issues of territorial jurisdiction and the Church’s role in the ecumenical process. The statement on the one hand showed to the cardinal’s flock that the would-be patriarch shared their concern over the Vatican’s Eastern policy, and on the other, sent a signal to the Vatican that the tensions within the Church were so high that he could not keep the situation under control. On 27 April 1993, Myroslav Ivan Liubachivsky came forward with another statement in which he announced the plan to build a Greek Catholic cathedral in Kiev. The move had to accelerate the process of the confirmation of the patriarchate.

39. See Reuter report from Kiev, 3 January 1995.

40. See “Ukrainian President received by Pope,” *OMRI Daily Reports*, 3 May 1995, and Reuter’s report on the issue from the Vatican City, 2 May 1995.

chal structures by the Vatican. The erection of the patriarchal cathedral in Kiev should also justify the desire of the Church to name its patriarchate that of Kiev and Halych and to support the Church's claims for the extension of its jurisdiction over the vast territories of eastern Ukraine. In his announcement of the plans to build the cathedral in Kiev, Myroslav Ivan Liubachivsky stated:

Bearing in mind the Patriarchal structure of the Kiev-Halych Patriarchate of our Church and the decision of the Lviv Synod to revive the Eparchy of Chernihiv-Vyshhorod with its seat in Kiev (the see responsible for all our parishes in Eastern, Central and Southern Ukraine), *we intend to build a Patriarchal Sobor for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in our capital city of Kiev.*

As the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, with the help of God, I dare to head this holy and essential Action of our people of God in the name of the existence and development of our Church throughout the sovereign territory of the independent Ukrainian State and the territories of settlement.⁴¹

Greek Catholics never managed to obtain the church building in the central regions of Kiev to serve as its cathedral; the decision to build the church, however, provided a solution to the problem. In the broader context, the issue of the Kievan cathedral helps us understand the way in which the Church has been trying to respond to the major challenge of its twentieth-century history—the challenge of the national idea.

The idea of Ukrainian nationalism that occupied the minds of the Galician intelligentsia at the turn of the century eventually made the Church serve as one of the major vehicles of the Ukrainian idea. Galician nationalists, who accepted the idea of an independent Ukraine from the Carpathian mountains in the west to the Don River in the east, wanted their Church to respond to this program and to overcome its regional, strictly Galician character. The strong desire to maintain the dialogue with an independent Autocephalous Orthodox Church in eastern Ukraine was one of the main characteristics of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's activity, which was developed further by his successor, Cardinal Slipyi.

The conflict between the local (regional) character of the Church and the all-Ukrainian aspirations of its adherents has reflected also in the official approach of the Church to the ecumenical problems. The goal of the Church in this area has been viewed as a return to the times of St. Volodymyr, the prince who baptized Kievan Rus' in 988. At that time, it is claimed, the Kievan (Ukrainian) Church comprised part of the Universal Church, not yet divided between East and West. Thus the unified Ukrainian Church, which should be comprised from

41. Press release, St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 6 May 1993.

Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox and should be in communion with both East and West, has been presented as the main goal of the Greek Catholic Church to be achieved in the future. As it was stated by the chancellor of the Lviv metropolitanate Rev. Ivan Datsko, the process of the unification of Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches in Ukraine depends on the position of the "Three Romes" — the Vatican, Constantinople, and Moscow. According to Datsko, if those religious centers pursued the goal of Christian unity, the prospects for Church unity in Ukraine would improve considerably.⁴²

Though the very idea of the unified Ukrainian Church does not contradict the Vatican's views on the provisions of future Church unity, a strong Ukrainian Church uniting Orthodox and Greek Catholics would be inconvenient for those Vatican ecumenists who have placed all their hopes on Moscow as well as for those Vatican centralists who do not want to see strong autonomous local churches.

CONCLUSION

The restoration of Ukrainian independence after the December 1991 referendum in Ukraine created a new environment for religious activity in the country. The most dramatic changes took place within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that eventually split into three Orthodox Churches, two of them with autocephalous status and one in the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate. In the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church under the influence of the victorious national ideology, the movement for patriarchal status for the Church has intensified.

In the twentieth century that Church has sustained two major losses caused by the advance of Ukrainian national ideology. The first was the mass conversion of Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy in the 1920s in the USA and Canada; the second was the refusal of a significant part of the once Greek Catholic parishes to convert back to Greek Catholicism after the legalization of the Church in 1989. In both cases, former Greek Catholics preferred the more nationalistic-oriented Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. After the proclamation of the Orthodox patriarchate in Ukraine and restoration of Ukrainian independence, the Greek Catholic authorities faced new challenges with

42. Rev. Ivan Datsko, "Spivvidnoshennia UHKHTserkvy z inshymy konfesiiamy Ukrainy," *Ukrainske slovo*, 28 February 1993. Dissatisfaction of Greek Catholics in Ukraine with the actions of the Vatican has been reflected in the results of a poll conducted in Ukraine in 1994. Of those questioned, 72.7 percent claimed to be Orthodox, 16.7 percent recognized Cardinal Liubachivsky as their spiritual leader, and only 14.6 percent recognized the Pope; Of Greek Catholics, 56.3 percent favored the creation of one national church in Ukraine; see Oleksii Shuba, "Iedyna natsionalna tserkva: mit chy diisnist?" *Ukrainska dumka*, 12 May 1994.

respect to Ukrainian national ideology and were forced to go forward with the idea of the Greek Catholic patriarchate.

The legalization of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the period of Gorbachev's "perestroika" and "glasnost" provoked a sharp anti-Catholic reaction on the part of the Moscow patriarchate. The conflict in Vatican-Moscow relations that emerged after the collapse of the USSR has been extremely deep and not easy to overcome. The Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church, which allowed Eastern Catholics to participate in the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue, nevertheless condemned the "uniatism" as an inappropriate form of Christian unity.

After its legalization, the Greek Catholic Church found itself under constant attack from the Christian East, with little support on the part of the Christian West. There has also been little understanding of Church problems on the part of the Ukrainian government, even though the Church proved itself an ardent supporter and promoter of the idea of Ukrainian independence. During President Kuchma's visit to the Vatican in May 1995, the pope agreed to turn down the invitation extended by Church authorities to visit Ukraine in 1996 to mark the 400th anniversary of the Church. He also assured the president that the celebrations in Ukraine would be held "in the spirit of church unity."

Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that Rome will make use of the anniversary to recognize the Kiev and Halych patriarchate proclaimed by Joseph Slipyi. It is much more likely that, if the Greek Catholic patriarchate should be recognized by Rome in the near future, its territory will be limited mainly to Galicia. On the eve of its 400th anniversary, after decades of suffering under the atheistic Soviet regime and the triumphal restoration of the late 1980s, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is struggling again, this time to prove that its existence is not the consequence of a mistake committed by Rome in the late sixteenth century.