

The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era

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IN MARCH 2000 THE UKRAINIAN SECTION of the BBC broadcast a special programme devoted to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657) and his historical legacy. A number of historians in Ukraine, Russia and Canada, as well as people on the streets of Kyiv, Moscow and Warsaw, were asked the same question: what did the name of Khmelnytsky mean to them? While in Warsaw the hetman's name was associated first and foremost with the Cossack rebellion of 1648, in Kyiv and Moscow his legacy was viewed almost exclusively through the prism of the 1654 Pereyaslav Agreement, which placed the Ukrainian Cossack state under the protection of the Muscovite tsar and initiated a long era of Russian domination in Ukraine.¹

In Moscow Khmelnytsky was seen both by professional historians and by the 'man in the street' as the one who had brought Russia and Ukraine together by means of the Pereyaslav Agreement. A distinguished Russian historian, Gennadii Sanin, stated that he considered Khmelnytsky a great man, as he had not only united Russia and Ukraine but also conceived of a larger East European federation that would have included Moldavia, Wallachia and the Balkans as well.² Khmelnytsky's Pereyaslav legacy was viewed from a different perspective in Kyiv. A woman interviewed by a BBC correspondent in the Ukrainian capital was not even sure whether Khmelnytsky could be considered a Ukrainian, as she believed that he was also claimed by the Russians.

Other Kyivans interviewed for the programme strove to present the Pereyaslav episode in Khmelnytsky's career as an act forced upon him by unfavourable circumstances. One claimed that Khmelnytsky had been confronted with three choices—to accept the Turkish, Polish or Russian yoke—and had chosen the Russian one. The same opinion was expressed by another interviewee, who stated that Khmelnytsky's choice was the right one for his time. Similar ideas are to be encountered in the Ukrainian press, as well as in the writings of Ukrainian historians.³ Overall, despite a fair amount of sympathy for Khmelnytsky among these interviewees, his status as a national hero has been seriously shaken in independent Ukraine, first and foremost because of his role in bringing about the Russo-Ukrainian agreement at Pereyaslav.

Why do scholars and ordinary people in Russia and Ukraine view the legacy of the Pereyaslav Agreement so differently? What accounts for these different approaches to

the agreement, which a little more than a decade ago, before the beginning of *glasnost* and the dissolution of the USSR, was unanimously viewed by Soviet historians in both Russia and Ukraine as an important and positive event in their nations' histories? The answer to this question is closely related to the fate of Soviet historiography in general and the changes that affected historians and historiographical concepts in the post-Soviet space after the dissolution of the USSR and Moscow's loss of control over non-Russian cultures and historiographies. It also touches upon the more theoretically informed question of the interrelation between historical and national identities in the newly independent states of Eurasia in general, and in the Slavic republics of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in particular. To what degree did changes in historical paradigms in these countries influence nation-building projects (and vice versa), and to what degree did they promote or, on the contrary, retard the development of a common identity in the countries of the *Slavia Orthodoxa*? In this article I do not intend to provide answers to any of these major questions, but instead will try to enrich my analysis of a particular historiographical debate by adopting this broader theoretical approach.⁴

It would be difficult to find a better point of departure for discussing the importance of the Pereyaslav legacy in contemporary Ukraine than the events that took place in the town of Pereyaslav in the summer of 1992. On 21 June, 338 years after the conclusion of the Pereyaslav Agreement between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite boyars, activists of the Ukrainian Cossack brotherhood from all over Ukraine descended on that sleepy provincial centre to convene a new Cossack council. There were only two points on their agenda: a denunciation of the oath given by the Ukrainian Cossacks to the Russian tsar and the swearing of an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. In the text of the declaration adopted by the Pereyaslav Council of 1992, Muscovy in general and the Muscovite tsars in particular were accused of betraying the naive and God-fearing Cossacks, conspiring with their enemies, taking over their lands, destroying their language and customs and, most recently, attempting to rend Ukrainian territory with the talons of a two-headed eagle, the central element in the old tsarist coat of arms that was readopted by the Russian Federation under Boris El'tsin. The council's proclamation stated that the Ukrainian Cossacks were denouncing their oath to the tsar, so that those seeking to place Ukraine under a new yoke would not be able to exploit their old oath in Pereyaslav.⁵

In historical and legal terms, the whole undertaking was completely anachronistic, as the Russo-Ukrainian treaty of 1654 was officially denounced by Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky in his 'Manifesto to Foreign Rulers' less than five years after the original Pereyaslav Council. Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of the event becomes clearer when placed in the context of Ukrainian nation-building efforts, Ukraine's relations with Russia, and internal debates on both issues within the Ukrainian parliament. In that context, it comes as no surprise that the person who read the Pereyaslav declaration denouncing Cossack allegiance to the tsar was none other than Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Soviet-era dissident and a contender in the 1991 presidential elections. In 1992 he was also the hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the leader of the Rukh party, the main opposition force in the Ukrainian parliament. The presence at the ceremony of a deputy speaker of the Ukrainian parliament also added to the symbolic significance of the event. The stain of Pereyaslav was something that

the activists and supporters of the Ukrainian national movement obviously wanted to remove from what they saw as the otherwise spotless image of Ukrainian Cossackdom.

The Ukrainian Cossacks' active intervention in the process of nation building and Russo-Ukrainian relations did not end with the 1992 denunciation of the Pereyaslav Agreement. In 1995 the Cossacks, now led by the former head of the Political and Educational Administration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Volodymyr Mulyava, took an active part in the commemoration of the Battle of Konotop (1659), where Cossack detachments led by Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and assisted by the Crimean Tatars had defeated a numerically superior Muscovite army. The celebrations in Konotop featured, among other things, a scholarly conference on the history of the battle that was attended by some of Ukraine's leading experts on the Cossack past. The message that the participants were sending to the outside world was quite clear. They were turning to history in order to reveal the most glorious episode of their anti-Muscovite struggle, deliberately suppressed by Russian imperial and Soviet historians. On the political level, Cossackdom, a non-governmental organisation that had forged close links with the national-democratic political parties and organisations, was also taking a strong stand against threats to Ukrainian territorial integrity then emanating from the Russian political establishment.⁶

The 'return' of the Cossack myth during the last years of Soviet rule in Ukraine proved significant for the revival of the suppressed Ukrainian national identity on the eve of the disintegration of the USSR. Since then, the myth has faced a number of challenges in newly independent Ukraine. One of them is related to the fact that the Cossack period left a somewhat confusing legacy when it comes to Ukrainian relations with Russia, an important 'other' in Ukraine's contemporary self-identification. On the one hand, the Cossacks are known for numerous uprisings and wars waged against Russian rule: the revolt led by Hetman Ivan Mazepa in the early 18th century is seen as the most vivid example of Cossack antagonism toward Russia. On the other hand, it was also a Cossack hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who accepted the protectorate of the Muscovite tsars. For centuries, the attitude of Ukraine's political groupings and leaders to the Pereyaslav Agreement was considered a significant indicator of their political orientation. The same holds true for contemporary Ukraine.⁷

The legacy of Pereyaslav and the Khmelnytsky revolt in general is viewed today as an important factor in the formation of a new paradigm of Ukrainian national history, closely linked with Ukraine's nation-building project.⁸ Since the early 1990s the history of the Pereyaslav Agreement has become a politically sensitive topic in the sporadic but continuing discussions between Russian and Ukrainian historians. Generally speaking, since the disintegration of the USSR, representatives of the two national historiographies have taken profoundly different attitudes toward the historical role and importance of the agreement.

One of the most controversial topics in current Russo-Ukrainian discussions on the legacy of Pereyaslav has been the usage of the term 'reunification'. Ukrainian historiography has effectively rejected the old Soviet cliché of the Pereyaslav Agreement as a reunification of Russia and Ukraine, which was imposed on scholars by the 'Theses' approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 300th

anniversary of the event in 1954. In Soviet historiography the Khmelnytsky Uprising was known as the 'Ukrainian people's war of liberation'. This official term implied that the uprising was a war of the toiling masses against their overlords, as well as the climax of the struggle of Ukrainian society as a whole against Polish oppression and for 'reunification' with fraternal Russia. That message was also strengthened by the officially adopted chronology of the war, which allegedly came to an end with the decision of the Pereyaslav Council in January 1654. At that time Ukraine's war aims were allegedly achieved: the Polish yoke was thrown off, reunification took place, and the toiling masses of Russia and Ukraine united their forces in common struggle against social oppression and foreign subjugation.⁹

In independent Ukraine the term 'reunification' has been completely abandoned by scholars and politicians alike, resulting in the disappearance of the term from scholarly and popular literature and the media. 'Reunification' has also been dropped from the official name of Dnipropetrovsk University, which was named in 1954 for 'the three hundredth anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia', as well as from the official titles of other Ukrainian institutions.¹⁰ Despite the clear unpopularity of the term in Ukraine, it continues to be used in Russia on both the popular and scholarly levels. The Moscow historian Gennadii Sanin stated in his previously mentioned BBC interview that he liked the term and was in favour of using it, since, in his opinion, it indicated the voluntary nature of the Russo-Ukrainian alliance.¹¹

Qualified support for the term was also expressed by another Russian historian, the recently deceased expert on the history of Russian foreign policy of the mid-17th century, Lev Zaborovsky. In his presentation at a conference of Russian and Ukrainian historians held in Moscow in May 1996 he stated that Russian historians had fewer reasons than their Ukrainian colleagues to revise their earlier approaches to the history of the Pereyaslav Agreement. He claimed that Soviet political control had been much stronger in Ukraine than in Moscow, and that he personally had never even read the notorious 1954 'Theses'.¹² Zaborovsky also said that he had always considered the term 'reunification' artificial and preferred not to use it in his writings. Nevertheless, in the past few years he had begun to rethink the matter, as new historical sources recently discovered by him and his colleagues revealed that, if not the term itself, then its ideological significance was quite popular at the time of the Pereyaslav Council. According to Zaborovsky, this was reflected in statements by residents of the Cossack state recorded by Muscovite diplomats who visited Ukraine at the time. Zaborovsky suggested maintaining the term 'reunification', but freeing it from the ideological baggage of the past.¹³

What accounts for the continuing attractiveness of the term 'reunification', which represents a set of views clearly misused by Soviet historiography, in the eyes of Russian historians? One possible explanation of ongoing Russian attempts to retain this part of the Soviet heritage is to be found in the fact that 'reunification' was not a Soviet invention. The term was borrowed from the works of the 19th-century Ukrainian writer and historian Panteleimon Kulish, who wrote about the 'reunification of Rus' and was strongly opposed to the Western orientation in Ukrainian cultural and political life.¹⁴ In the 1950s the 'reunification of Rus' was replaced with the concept of the 'reunification of Ukraine with Russia', which combined some elements

of the old pre-Soviet Russian nationalism with Soviet-era recognition of the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation.

It is hardly surprising that the politically motivated approaches to the Khmelnytsky revolt and the history of the Pereyaslav Agreement influencing the writings of Russian specialists on the 17th century are most articulately expressed in the works of those who write on current policy issues. Some striking views on the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations, apparently shared by the Russian foreign policy establishment, have recently been presented by Sergei Samuilov, the head of a department of the Russian Academy's Institute of the USA and Canada. Writing in the Russian foreign policy journal *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, he attacked the position taken by John Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk in their article on Ukrainian foreign policy that appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1996. Samuilov set himself the primary task of proving that the Ukrainians were not a fully developed people and that Ukraine was never an independent state, hence it was never 'forcefully incorporated by imperial Moscow'. The more practical goal of his article was to challenge mistaken stereotypes of Ukraine and its history that allegedly enjoyed broad currency in the USA, as well as to warn 'interested circles' in the USA against possible errors in American foreign policy.¹⁵

In dealing with the history of Ukrainian statehood, Samuilov could not avoid a discussion of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the meaning and consequences of the Pereyaslav Agreement. Seeking to revisit and revise the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations, Samuilov does not conceal his main source of ideological inspiration. He finds it in the works of the 19th-century Russian and Ukrainian historian and writer, Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov,¹⁶ who, despite his important contribution to modern Ukrainian historiography, believed that Ukrainians and Russians constituted two branches of one Rus' people. Not surprisingly, Samuilov praises Kostomarov highly as a 'true scholar', counterposing him to the founder of Ukrainian national historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, whom Samuilov accuses of every conceivable deadly sin, including alleged racism.¹⁷ Inspired by Kostomarov's concept of the age-old struggle between Poland and Rus', as well as by his Orthodox religious sympathies, Samuilov writes that the Khmelnytsky revolt was motivated by Ukraine's desire to 'save and protect itself as a Russian Slavic Orthodox ethnos from forcible Polish Catholic assimilation'.¹⁸

Samuilov, in fact, rejects the Soviet-era image of Khmelnytsky as a leader who allegedly dreamt of 'reunification' with Russia. Instead, he claims that Khmelnytsky conducted a pro-Polish foreign and domestic policy but was forced to conclude an agreement with the tsar owing to pressure from the 'popular masses'. In his attempt to undermine the thesis of Ukraine's forcible incorporation into the Russian state, Samuilov questions the independent status of Khmelnytsky's polity on the eve of Pereyaslav and claims that Ukraine joined the Russian state voluntarily. Seeking to counter the Ukrainian foreign policy establishment's European option and Ukrainian intellectuals' belief in the European character of their culture, Samuilov claims that Ukrainians have much more in common with the Russians than with the Poles, which allegedly explains why they emigrated in significant numbers not to the Catholic West but to Orthodox Russia during the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In bizarre fashion, Samuilov even finds an argument against Ukraine's claim to be a European nation in

the well-known fact that Khmelnytsky often fought the Poles in alliance with the Crimean Tatars.¹⁹ In Samuilov's opinion, 'the Little Russians (Ukrainians) were saved by Orthodox Russia, as a Russian, Slavic and Orthodox ethnos, from the threat of complete assimilation according to the Polish Catholic model'.²⁰

Samuilov's views on the causes and outcome of the Khmelnytsky revolt reflect not only the influence of Kostomarov's ideas about the importance of nationality and religion in the forging of the Russo-Ukrainian alliance but also some clear parallels with the 'Theses' of 1954. According to the 'Theses', 'for the Ukrainian people, the historic importance of the Pereyaslav Council's decision lay primarily in the fact that union with Russia within a single state, the Russian state, saved Ukraine from subjugation to the Polish nobility and from annexation by the Turkish sultans'.²¹ One of the major differences between the 'Theses' and Samuilov's approach to the Pereyaslav Agreement lies in the fact that, unlike his communist forerunners, Samuilov rejects the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and revives the 19th-century imperial paradigm, which treated Ukrainians as a sub-division of the Russian nation. The conclusion that Samuilov draws from his historical excursus is quite simple: Ukraine belongs to 'all-Russian culture and Slavic Orthodox civilisation' and is destined to exist in 'close union with Russia'.²²

The apparent return of many contemporary Russian thinkers and politicians to the pre-Soviet concept of the existence of one Russian people, which, in their opinion, has been unjustifiably divided by post-Soviet borders but will be reunited in the future, should be viewed as one of the conditions contributing to the survival of 'reunification' terminology in contemporary Russia. By reviving ideas of pre-revolutionary authors on the unity of the 'all-Russian' people and Orthodox Slavic solidarity, and by keeping the term 'reunification' alive, the Russian academic and foreign policy elite is clearly leaving the door open for new 'reunifications' in the future.

What are the main features of current Ukrainian writing on the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising? In independent Ukraine the approach of the 1954 'Theses' to the history of the Khmelnytsky revolt was promptly rejected. The development of a new terminology and a new interpretation of the uprising has not, however, proved an easy task.²³ One might assume that the easiest way for post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography to deal with these problems would be to go back to the pre-Soviet Ukrainian historiographical tradition or to borrow from diaspora writings on the topic, as Ukrainian historians have often done since 1991.

Indeed, in the case of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, post-Soviet Ukrainian historians have actively borrowed from the diaspora writings of adherents of the 'statist school' in Ukrainian historiography, often adopting the statist approach to the history of the uprising and the activities of its leader. According to that paradigm, the main outcome of the uprising was the formation of the Cossack Ukrainian state, and Khmelnytsky's principal accomplishment was the successful realisation of the state-building project. The elements of the statist approach to the history of the uprising made their way to Ukraine in the late 1980s and became the dominant factor in historical and political discourse after Ukraine acquired its independence in 1991. In the autumn of 1995 the Ukrainian government sponsored official celebrations of the 400th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's birth. Both the president of Ukraine and the head of its parliament

took part in these celebrations, which were held in Khmelnytsky's capital, the town of Chyhyryn. In official pronouncements and articles published on the occasion, Khmelnytsky was praised first and foremost as a state builder, the founder of early modern Ukrainian statehood.

Contemporary Ukrainian views on the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising are a curious combination of pre-Soviet, Soviet-era and diaspora approaches to the history of that important era in Ukrainian history in general, and Cossack history in particular. While actively borrowing from diaspora writings, post-Soviet Ukrainian historians have also shown their dissatisfaction with some of the terms and concepts employed by the statist. This applies particularly to the official name given to the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The traditional term used in Ukrainian populist and statist historiography alike was 'Khmel'nychchyna', which diaspora authors translated into English as 'Khmelnytsky Uprising' or 'Khmelnytsky Revolt'.

For a number of reasons, the term 'Khmel'nychchyna' was not revived in Ukrainian historiography after 1991. According to Yurii Mytsyk, one of the leading Ukrainian specialists on the period, 'Khmel'nychchyna' was politically unacceptable to the new Ukrainian historiography because of the negative connotation attached in Soviet-era discourse to the name of any movement or event derived from the surname of its leader. The communist authorities often used labels derived from the names of Ukrainian political leaders to discredit movements led by them. This was the case, for example, with 'Petlyurivshchyna', the term used to define the Ukrainian state of 1919–20 led by Symon Petlyura, and 'Banderivshchyna', the term applied to the Ukrainian resistance movement headed by the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Stepan Bandera. Another possible reason for the rejection of the term 'Khmelnychchyna' is the obvious reluctance of post-Soviet historians to use a conceptually neutral term to designate a revolt that played such a crucial role in Ukrainian history. Post-Soviet historians have clearly been looking for a term and chronological frame of reference that would reflect their new, independence-minded view of the Ukrainian past.²⁴

There is little doubt that the current search of Ukrainian historians for a conceptually loaded and politically acceptable term for the Khmelnytsky Uprising should be viewed as a legacy of the old Soviet historiography. In the Soviet tradition, the discussion of terminological issues pertaining to the politically correct labelling of the Khmelnytsky Uprising can be traced back to the late 1920s, when the school of Ukrainian Marxist historians led by Matvii Yavorsky was defeated by the leader of Russian Marxist historiography, Mikhail Pokrovsky, and his followers. At that time at least three competing views on the name to be given to the Khmelnytsky Uprising were under discussion: Yavorsky defended the term 'Cossack revolution', his student Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko defined the uprising as a bourgeois and national revolution, and Karpenko, another participant in the discussion, defended Pokrovsky's definition of the uprising as a peasant war. In the long run it was Yavorsky and Sukhyno-Khomenko who lost the argument and Karpenko who won it,²⁵ for in the 1930s Soviet historians were forced to adopt the view according to which the peasants, supported by the urban toiling masses, were the 'hegemon' of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. This approach to the history of the uprising remained dominant in Soviet writing on the subject until the late 1980s. As the 'Theses' had it, 'the chief

and decisive force in this war was the peasantry, which was fighting both social oppression by the Polish and Ukrainian feudal landlords and alien subjugation'.²⁶

There are other parallels as well between the writings of contemporary Ukrainian historians and the ideas developed by their predecessors during the Soviet period. Consciously or not, some contemporary Ukrainian historians echo the official dogma of 1930s Soviet historiography, which considered the acceptance of the Russian protectorate a 'lesser evil' for Ukraine than the incorporation of the Cossack state into Poland or the Ottoman Empire. It was in this vein that Academician Petro Tolochko, one of the most politically active Ukrainian historians, stated in 1991 that there was no need to make a new hero of Ivan Mazepa so as to put him in the place traditionally occupied in Ukrainian historical consciousness by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. According to Tolochko, Khmelnytsky's contribution to the Ukrainian national renaissance was much more significant than Mazepa's. He also stated that, given the aggressive policy adopted against Ukraine in the mid-17th century by Poland, Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, and taking into account the allegedly unfavourable conditions of a possible Swedish protectorate, Khmelnytsky's choice at Pereyaslav was 'the only correct decision, that of union with Russia, with which we shared not only a common history but also one Orthodox faith'.²⁷

To a degree, variants of the same idea can be found in the writings of Tolochko's one-time protégé, the director of the Institute of Ukrainian History of the National Academy of Sciences and a former vice-premier responsible for humanitarian issues, Valerii Smolii. In his scholarly writings Smolii declines to evaluate Pereyaslav as a mistake on Khmelnytsky's part. He maintains that Khmelnytsky, faced with a choice between the Ottomans and Russia, decided on the Muscovite alternative, taking the religious factor into account. His acceptance of the Muscovite protectorate was, in Smolii's opinion, a step conceived 'in the process of painful reflection on the fate of Ukraine and its future'.²⁸ Smolii does not treat the Pereyaslav Agreement as one that subordinated Ukraine to Russia, thereby downplaying the controversy over the wisdom of the choice made by the hetman in Pereyaslav.²⁹

Probably the single most influential factor in contemporary Ukrainian historical writing on the Khmelnytsky Uprising is the impact of the ideas formulated back in the mid-1960s by the then dissident Ukrainian historian and the current patriarch of Ukrainian national historiography, Mykhailo Braichevsky. In Soviet Ukraine he was the first to challenge the official paradigm of 1954. In the mid-1960s Braichevsky wrote an essay arguing in favour of replacing the politically loaded term 're-unification' with a more neutral one, 'incorporation'. Braichevsky also advocated the restoration of the class-based approach to Ukrainian history and attacked the legacy of Stalinism and Great Russian chauvinism in historical scholarship. The essay was never published in Ukraine, but first found its way into *samizdat* and then was smuggled to the West, where in the early 1970s it appeared in print in Ukrainian and English. The author, meanwhile, was forced by the authorities to issue a statement protesting against the publication of his work abroad and was dismissed from his position at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences.³⁰

In his pamphlet, Braichevsky undertook a generally successful attempt to deconstruct the pan-Russian 'reunification' myth by means of a class-based methodology. He claimed that the term 'reunification' had helped to establish the idea of the

superiority of the Russians to other peoples of the USSR, idealised the Russian autocracy, and neglected the positive aspects of the Ukrainian people's liberation struggle. While deconstructing the pan-Russian myth, Braichevsky attempted to develop a Ukrainian national paradigm of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, making use of the class-friendly national-liberation mythology to that end. Braichevsky suggested replacing the officially approved definition of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as the 'Ukrainian people's war of liberation' with a new one, the 'war of national liberation'. He was not alone among Soviet Ukrainian historians in suggesting this change. About the same time as Braichevsky wrote his pamphlet, some of his colleagues, including the subsequently persecuted historian of Ukrainian Cossackdom, Olena Apanovych, attempted to apply this politically attractive term to early modern Ukrainian history, thereby stressing the priority of the national factor in the war over the officially favoured social ones.³¹ The use of the term 'war of national liberation' had clear positive connotations in the USSR of the mid-1960s, when national-liberation movements in the Third World were viewed as a positive phenomenon by Soviet ideologists.

The ideas expressed by Braichevsky in the 1960s managed to influence a relatively large number of Ukrainian historians in the 1970s and 1980s and, naturally, found their way into the writings of historians in independent Ukraine. This was the case not only with Braichevsky's use of 'national-liberation' terminology but also with his employment of a class-based method to deconstruct the pan-Russian paradigm of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. It was with the aid of this method that in the late 1980s a historian from Kamyanets-Podilskyi, Valerii Stepankov, challenged the Soviet-era chronology of the Khmelnytsky revolt, declining to accept the Pereiaslav Agreement as the end of the uprising. In the course of his study of the peasant revolts of the mid-17th century Stepankov became convinced that the peasant war that began in 1648 did not end after the Pereiaslav Agreement but continued into the 1670s. Stepankov initially suggested the later terminus of the war on the basis of a class-oriented approach, but subsequently modified his position and made an argument grounded in the Ukrainian statist paradigm to support his original view. He claimed that the resignation of Hetman Petro Doroshenko in 1676 signalled the failure of Cossack attempts to reunite the Ukrainian lands into a single state and should be viewed as marking the end of the period that began with the Khmelnytsky Uprising in 1648.

The new term suggested by Stepankov to define the period of Ukrainian history between 1648 and 1676 was the 'Ukrainian national revolution'. This term, as well as Stepankov's periodisation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, gained considerable notice in Ukraine, partly because he often published his works in co-authorship with the director of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ukrainian History, Academician Valerii Smolii. Stepankov's idea of a Ukrainian national revolution also made its way into the seventh volume of the multi-volume series 'Ukraine through the Centuries', written by Stepankov and Smolii and given the title *The Ukrainian National Revolution of the Seventeenth Century (1646–1676)*.³² In adopting the term 'revolution', Stepankov actually outdid Braichevsky in his application of the class-based approach and returned to the Ukrainian historiographical tradition of the post-revolutionary decade, when that term was accepted and used both by representatives of the

old populist school, led by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and by some representatives of Ukrainian Marxist historiography, including Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko.³³

Not surprisingly, in the new post-Soviet and officially pro-market Ukraine, Stepankov's reliance on the 'revolutionary' terminology closely associated with the old regime met with reservations. Stepankov's colleague Yuriy Mytsyk rebelled against the use of the term 'revolution', declining to use terminology implying the primacy of the social factor in the uprising. Challenging Stepankov's choice of 1676 as the terminal date of the revolution, Mytsyk took a statist approach to the problem. He argued that the Cossack state did not disappear with Doroshenko's resignation, but continued to exist in Right-Bank Ukraine until the 1720s, while in Russian-ruled Left-Bank Ukraine it survived even longer, until the second half of the 18th century. Instead, Mytsyk suggested that the Hadyach Agreement of 1658 between Poland and the Cossacks be taken to mark the end of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In Mytsyk's opinion that agreement officially ended the Polish-Ukrainian conflict that began in 1648 and terminated the short-lived period of Ukrainian independence.³⁴ Following in the footsteps of Braichevsky and Soviet Ukrainian historiography of the 1960s, Mytsyk defined the period between 1648 and 1658 as a 'war of national liberation'.

Mytsyk's revival of this term reflects the trend now dominant in Ukrainian historiography. Nevertheless, Ukrainian historians are far from unanimous on this point, with Stepankov and occasionally his co-author Smolii continuing to use the term 'revolution'.³⁵ Both terms and chronological divisions are used concurrently. For example, Stepankov has published a paper on the 'Ukrainian national revolution' in a collection of articles that not only bears the title *The National-Liberation War of the Ukrainian People of the Mid-Seventeenth Century* but also includes an article by his colleague Valerii Smolii on 'The National-Liberation War in the Context of Ukrainian Nation Building'. In that article, contrary to all of Stepankov's arguments and even to some of his own writings, Smolii defined a short period at the beginning of the uprising, between January and May 1648, as a national revolution.³⁶

Despite obvious sloppiness in the use of historical terminology, the current disagreements among Ukrainian historians on the character and chronology of the Khmelnytsky revolt point to a number of major changes occurring in contemporary Ukrainian historiography. First of all, they indicate the growing maturity of the historical profession, which is gradually overcoming the Soviet heritage of ideological uniformity. They also reveal not only differences among historians in treating the course of the revolt and the Pereyaslav Agreement but also signs of growing consensus on a number of important issues pertaining to the problem. Quite obviously, most Ukrainian historians now reject the view that the Pereyaslav Agreement was the paramount event of the war and accept the use of the term 'national' in their definition of the war. The latter point may serve as an indication of an important development currently under way in Ukrainian historical discourse. Within the past few years, Ukrainian scholars have begun to pay special attention to the role of the national factor in the history of the Khmelnytsky revolt and other Cossack uprisings of the period. If in the late 1980s and early 1990s Ukrainian historians mainly emphasised the state-building element of Khmelnytsky's policies,³⁷ in the past few years significantly more effort has gone into portraying Khmelnytsky as a nation builder.

In his article on 'The National-Liberation War in the Context of Ukrainian Nation Building', which appeared in 1998, when Valerii Smolii was serving as vice-premier, he made the following statement in that regard: 'Today, hardly anyone needs to be convinced that the liberation epic of the mid-seventeenth century began a new epoch in the people's struggle for independence. Its main goal was the creation of an independent national state that would include all Ukrainian ethnic territories'.³⁸ Smolii, in fact, was not only summarising previous debates in Ukrainian historiography on the history of the Khmelnytsky revolt but also giving his official blessing to the 'nationalising' approach to the history of the uprising. As the Russian historian Lev Zaborovsky noted with respect to the nationally oriented Ukrainian interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, it has acquired clear characteristics of an official dogma and become a standard definition of the goals of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in textbooks and popular writings alike.³⁹ Interestingly enough, some Russian scholars, including Zaborovsky himself, have accepted the term 'national-liberation war' popularised by Ukrainian historians. Applied to the Khmelnytsky Uprising in order to denote a war for the liberation of the 'Little Russian' population from the Polish yoke, this term apparently does not contradict the paradigm of the reunification of Rus'.

Ukrainian and Russian historians dealing with the Pereyaslav Agreement have focused mainly on issues of terminology and chronology. Paradoxically, the legal nature of the Pereyaslav Agreement and the subsequent Muscovite-Cossack agreement concluded in Moscow in March 1654 has received little, if any, recent attention in either Russia or Ukraine. While Russian and Ukrainian historians of the early decades of the twentieth century could hardly agree whether the Pereyaslav Agreement constituted a protectorate, suzerainty, military alliance, personal union, real union or complete subordination, contemporary historians prefer to leave this topic alone. In Russia, Zaborovsky declared the whole discussion on the issue a 'scholarly pathology', while other historians, such as Sanin, agreed with the current Ukrainian definition of the Ukrainian-Russian agreement of 1654 as a kind of confederation.⁴⁰ Even though this definition is clearly a historical anachronism that does not correspond to the realities of the 1654 treaty, it is viewed as politically expedient by Ukrainian historians, as it satisfies their desire to underline the de facto independence or semi-independent status of the Hetmanate within the Muscovite state in Khmelnytsky's day.⁴¹

The way in which Ukrainian intellectual and political elites view the legacy of Pereyaslav may be reconstructed from a series of articles published in 1999 in the leading Kyiv daily *Den* to mark the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Council. The newspaper marked the 345th anniversary of the council in January 1999 with an article by its foreign policy analyst, Viktor Zamyatin, 'Pereyaslav Council 2: What Should Russo-Ukrainian Relations Be Like?' In his article Zamyatin linked the Pereyaslav Agreement with the ratification of the Russo-Ukrainian treaty of 1997 by the Council of the Federation of the Russian parliament. He also pointed out that, like the Pereyaslav Council, the ratification of the new Russo-Ukrainian agreement could produce a variety of unexpected consequences. 'In 1654', wrote Zamyatin, 'Khmelnytsky and the tsar's boyars concluded a treaty according to which Russia was supposed to provide military assistance to Ukraine in the war against Poland, but in fact Pereyaslav initiated the creation of the Russian Empire'. Russia's attempts to force

Ukraine to join the Russian-led Interparliamentary Assembly and sign the CIS statute could have equally unexpected results, wrote Zamyatin. He concluded by suggesting that Ukraine should rely only on its own resources, as integration with Russia, judging by the experience of Belarus, would not bring economic relief. Zamyatin also warned his readers against those forces pressing for union with Russia at all costs, as well as against those who blamed Russia for all of Ukraine's internal problems.⁴²

Very telling were the remarks on the historical significance of the Pereyaslav Council made by representatives of various political parties and quoted in the article. Volodymyr Moiseyenko, a leading member of the communist faction in the Ukrainian parliament, stated that the conclusion of the Pereyaslav Agreement was a major achievement on the part of Khmelnytsky and a highly positive development in the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations. In Moiseienko's opinion, the 1997 Russo-Ukrainian agreement was not as good as that of 1654, as the new treaty established borders between Russia and Ukraine, while Pereyaslav, allegedly, had liquidated them. Moiseienko nevertheless expressed his conviction that Russia and Ukraine would reunite in the future. Ivan Zaets, the leader of the Rukh faction in parliament, presented a different view, stating that there was no Pereyaslav agreement, as no treaty had been signed at Pereyaslav, and hence there was little to talk about. He called upon readers to reject the historical mythology developed by the 'northern capital' and return to their national roots, for in the course of 'three hundred years [of Russian rule] they took our soul and sold it to the devil'.⁴³

The comments offered by a government official on the significance of the Pereyaslav Council were, as always, quite ambiguous, although, like all statements of the Ukrainian political and bureaucratic elite on foreign policy issues, they hinted at the pro-Western orientation of contemporary Ukraine. Serhii Pirozhkov, the director of the Institute for the Study of Russo-Ukrainian Relations (a think tank attached to the Security Council of the presidential administration), stated in his *Den'* interview that the Pereyaslav Council had been a turning point in Ukrainian history. Nevertheless, he remarked: 'Currently we have a different stage in our history and different choices. Today our main strategic vector is different'.⁴⁴

In March 1999, when the Russian Council of the Federation was debating the ratification of the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty of 1997, the newspaper *Den'* reminded its readers that exactly 345 years earlier the Pereyaslav Agreement had been 'ratified' in Moscow with the conclusion of a formal treaty between the Russian tsar and the Cossack officers. In an article marking the anniversary, Viktor Horobets, one of the leading Ukrainian historians of the Cossack era, questioned the Soviet interpretation of the Khmelnytsky revolt as a war both for national liberation and for 'reunification' with Russia. He also stated that, despite the obvious ethnic, religious and cultural affinities between Russians and Ukrainians, the only way to achieve 'strategic partnership' between the two nations was for each to respect the other's interests.⁴⁵

While Ukrainian elites clearly want to shake off the legacy of Pereyaslav and legitimise their desire to 'rejoin' Europe in historical and other terms, they have to take into account the obvious unpreparedness of a highly Russified segment of the Eastern Ukrainian population to reject or reinterpret their Russian-oriented historical mythology. In spring 1999 the historian Valentyn Mohyla, writing in *Den'*, directly linked vacillation in the treatment of the Pereyaslav Council in contemporary

Ukrainian historiography with continuing divisions within Ukrainian society. 'We still do not have a clear answer to the question of whether the Pereyaslav Council was for Bohdan Khmelnytsky an end in itself or a means to an end ... Today one part of society, looking at Khmelnytsky's monument with his mace, views its direction as a sign [of rapprochement] with Moscow, while another sees it as an omen threatening Moscow'.⁴⁶ The columnist Serhii Makhun, writing in the 'History and I' section of *Den*, noted in December 1999 that there was a consensus among Ukrainian authors regarding Hetman Ivan Mazepa's choice in favour of Sweden in the Northern War of the early 18th century, while there was an obvious absence of such unanimity in the treatment of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the decisions of the Pereyaslav Council.⁴⁷

Given the existence in Ukraine of a large Russian minority and an even larger number of Russophones, it comes as no great surprise that on the level of both national and regional politics the issue of Russo-Ukrainian relations in general and Pereyaslav in particular remains very sensitive. The dissatisfaction of the population at large with the mismanagement of economic reforms at the national level clearly strengthens the pro-Russian orientation of some political parties and leaders in Eastern Ukraine and helps revive the image of Pereyaslav and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky favoured by Russia. As one pro-Russian businessman in the Eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk stated in an interview with Anatol Lieven, 'the population here is peaceful, but then up to now, no one has tried to mobilise them, to stir them up. Russia herself has shown no interest in this. But if the day came, then Moscow might well be able to create some kind of movement in East Ukraine with money and support, because many people here are really fed up, and find a new Bohdan Khmelnytsky to lead them'.⁴⁸

The current debates over the legacy of the Pereyaslav Agreement in Russian and Ukrainian historiography and in the mass media show that both Russian and Ukrainian historians are heavily dependent on the approaches to the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations developed by their predecessors. No participant in this debate has yet managed to reject the heritage of Soviet historiography in its entirety. On the contrary, by making selective use of the Soviet heritage and 'recycling' ideas associated with different stages of development of Soviet historiography, both sides have attempted to legitimise and strengthen their respective arguments in the course of the discussion. If Ukrainian authors build upon the internationalist and class-based approach of Soviet historiography in order to deconstruct the Russian nationalist and imperial paradigm of Ukrainian history, Russian authors develop those aspects of Soviet historiography that gained prominence in the last years of Stalin's rule and were influenced by pre-revolutionary Russian historiography.

No less selective has been the use by both Russian and Ukrainian historians of the heritage of non-Soviet historiography. While contemporary Ukrainian authors readily adopt many concepts produced by the 'statist' school of Ukrainian historiography, which perforce developed for most of the 20th century beyond the borders of Soviet Ukraine, Russian authors go back to the writings of the pre-revolutionary imperial historians. In particular, they rely on the intellectual heritage of some 19th-century Ukrainian writers and scholars who viewed Ukraine and its history as parts of a larger all-Russian national and historical tradition. The changing assessments of the histori-

cal legacy of Pereyaslav advanced by contemporary Russian and Ukrainian historians reflect and coincide with major changes in the development of national identities and nation-building projects in both countries.

It may be said that in Ukraine official historiographical discourse has followed the major turns of state-sponsored ideology, gradually shifting focus from state-building to nation-building elements of the national historical narrative. In the post-independence years one of the main characteristics of the Ukrainian nation-building project has been the restoration and reinvention of the national tradition, while orienting the nation's culture toward the West and stressing its distinctiveness from Russian culture and tradition. In Russia, on the contrary, the nation-building project has recently taken on a clear anti-Western orientation, with a strong emphasis on the idea of the Slavic and Orthodox unity of the Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. There is little doubt that so far Ukraine is the odd man out of this projected civilisational triangle. But it is equally obvious that the ghosts of Pereyaslav, unleashed by the collapse of communist ideology and the advance of Pan-Rusism, are becoming an ever more corporeal presence in contemporary Russian and Ukrainian political and cultural discourse.

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¹ The decision to accept the protectorate of the tsar of Muscovy was made by Khmelnytsky and his officers at a Cossack council in the town of Pereyaslav in January 1654, in the presence of the tsar's envoy, the boyar Vasilii Buturlin. In March of the same year Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich approved the conditions of the agreement brought to Moscow by Khmelnytsky's envoys. For an account of the events leading up to and following the Pereyaslav Agreement see Hans-Joachim Torke, 'The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century', in Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski & Gleb N. Zekulin (eds), *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 39–66 at pp. 42–48.

² For the audio record of the BBC programme on Bohdan Khmelnytsky see 'Nash vybir' at «www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian». For the treatment of Khmelnytsky's image in modern historiography see Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Changing Image of the Hetman', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 46, 4, 1998, pp. 531–545 (Ukrainian version: 'Minlyvyi obraz het' mana', *Krytyka*, 2, 14, 14 December 1998, pp. 4–8).

³ See 'Nash vybir' at «www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian». Cf. the following statement by the Ukrainian journalist and historian Serhii Makhun: 'They now talk about the Pereyaslav Council in somewhat subdued tones. But under whose "hand" was Bohdan Khmelnytsky supposed to go in that complex political situation, and under pressure from the absolute majority of the population of Ukraine? Perhaps [under the "hand"] of the Turkish sultans and the Crimean khan, who had caused great distress to Khmelnytsky himself?' ('Yak rozirvaty kolo vzayemnoho rakhunku obraz?', *Den'*, 25 December 1999).

⁴ For one of the first attempts to reevaluate the legacy of Soviet historiography see Yurii Afanas'ev (ed.), *Sovetskaya istoriografiya* (Moscow, 1996). On the interrelation of national identity and historical memory in Ukraine see Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London and New York, 1998), pp. 198–229, and Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park, PA, 1998).

⁵ See the text of the declaration in *Slava ukrains'koho kozatstva* (Melbourne and Kyiv, 1999), p. 306.

⁶ *Ibid.* On the activities of the Ukrainian Cossacks and their links to political parties and the armed forces in Ukraine see Olexander Hryb, 'New Ukrainian Cossacks—Revival or Building New Armed Forces?' *Ukrainian Review*, 46, 1, Spring 1999, pp. 44–53. For the role of the Cossack heritage in the Ukrainian national revival in the late 1980s and early 1990s see Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology', *Social Research*, 58, 4, Winter 1991, pp. 845–864; Serhii Plokhly, 'Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border

Dispute', in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY and London, 1994), pp. 147–170.

⁷ On the historiographical debates over the significance of the Pereiaslav Agreement see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982). On differences between Russian and Ukrainian historians in the interpretation of Ukrainian history see Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton, 1992); Stephen Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991* (New York, 1993).

⁸ On the peculiarities of the nation-building project in Ukraine see Dominique Arel, 'Ukraine—The Temptation of the Nationalizing State', in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, The International Politics of Eurasia*, vol. 7 (Armonk, NY and London, 1995), pp. 157–188; Roman Szporluk, 'Nation-Building in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects', in J. W. Blaney (ed.), *The Successor States to the USSR* (Washington DC, 1995), pp. 173–183; and the relevant chapters in Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York, 1993), and Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*.

⁹ See the English translation of the 'Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia (1654–1954)' in Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, pp. 270–288 at p. 275.

¹⁰ In 1998, after prolonged discussion, the university was named for Oles Honchar, a prominent Ukrainian novelist and graduate of the university.

¹¹ For Sanin's remarks see the recording of the BBC programme on Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 'Nash vybir', at <www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian>.

¹² See Lev Zaborovsky, 'Pereiaslavskaya rada i moskovskie soglaseniya 1654 goda: Problemy i issledovaniya', *Rossiya-Ukraina: istoriya vzaimootnosheni* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 39–49 at p. 39.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 45.

¹⁴ On Kulish's historical writings see Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process*, pp. 167–172. For his literary biography see George Luckyj, *Panteleimon Kulish: A Sketch of his Life and Times* (Boulder, CO, 1983). For the reintroduction of the concept of 'reunification' into Russian émigré literature on the eve of World War II, in relation to Hitler's *Anschluss* with Austria, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Pereiaslav: History and Myth', in John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, pp. xi–xxiii at pp. xx–xxi.

¹⁵ See Sergei Samuilov, 'O nekotorykh amerikanskikh stereotipakh v otnosheni Ukrainy', *SSH: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1997, 3, pp. 84–96; 1997, 4, pp. 81–90; here, 1997, 3, p. 84. For a Ukrainian response to Samuilov's article see Oleksii Haran, 'Pro "rasyzm Hrushevs'koho" ta "pol's'ku intryhu". Rosiis'ka nauka dolaye "amerykans'ki stereotypy shchodo Ukrainy"', *Den*, 5 August 1997.

¹⁶ Ironically, Kostomarov's views on Khmelnytsky and the Pereiaslav Agreement were considered anti-Russian by 19th-century Russian historians. For Kostomarov's treatment of the Pereiaslav Agreement and a critique of Kostomarov by Gennadii Karpov, a student of Sergei Solov'ev, see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, pp. 103–109. On Kostomarov's life see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykola Kostomarov: A Biography* (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1996).

¹⁷ For a political biography of Mykhailo Hrushevsky see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987). On his historiographical views see Frank E. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the History of Ukraine-Rus', in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. 1: *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. xxi–xlii. For Hrushevsky's views on the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks see Serhii Plokhyy, 'Revisiting the Golden Age: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Early History of the Ukrainian Cossacks', introduction to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. 7: *The Cossack Age to 1625* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999), pp. xxvii–lii.

¹⁸ Samuilov, 'O nekotorykh amerikanskikh stereotipakh v otnosheni Ukrainy', *SSH: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1997, 3, p. 93.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1997, 4, p. 93.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1997, 3, p. 95.

²¹ See the English translation of the 'Theses' in Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, pp. 270–288 at p. 275.

²² Samuilov, 'O nekotorykh amerikanskikh stereotipakh v otnosheni Ukrainy', 1997, 4, p. 90.

²³ On developments in Ukrainian historiography since independence see Orest Subtelny, 'The Current State of Ukrainian Historiography', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 18, 1–2, Summer–Winter 1993, pp. 33–54; Mark von Hagen, 'Does Ukraine Have a History?' *Slavic Review*, 54, 3, Fall 1995, pp. 658–673 (with the following discussion of this article); and Zenon Kohut, 'Vidchytuvannya a Het'manshchyny: Derzhavotvorchi derzhavoshukannya', *Krytyka*, 4, 6, June 2000, pp. 4–8 (forthcoming in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*). On the use of history in Russo-Ukrainian disputes see Andrew Wilson, 'The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30, 2, April 1995, pp. 265–289.

²⁴ See Yurii Mytsyk, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1658 rr. (Pidsumky, problemy i perspektyvy doslidzhennya)', in *Bytva pid Korsunem i natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina seredyny XVII stolittya* (Korsun'–Shevchenkivs'kyi, 1998), pp. 27–59 at pp. 34–35. Mytsyk also mentions the case of 'Kornilovshchyna', but one could add to this list the official names given to all sorts of 'nationalist' deviations in the ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party, such as Volobuevshchyna, Skrypnikivshchyna, Yavorschyna and Shelestivshchyna. In contemporary Ukraine all these terms have a strong negative connotation.

²⁵ See the records of the discussion among Ukrainian Marxist historians on Matvii Yavorsky's conception of Ukrainian history in *Litopys revolyutsii*, 1930, 3–4, pp. 213–218; 1930, 5, pp. 295–297, 317–319, 322–323, and Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko, 'Na marksysts'komu istorychnomu fronti', *Bil'shovyk Ukraïny*, 1929, 17–18, pp. 47–51.

²⁶ See the English translation of the 'Theses' in Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, p. 273.

²⁷ Reprinted in Petro Tolochko, *Vid Rusi do Ukraïny: Vybrani naukovopopulyarni, krytychni ta publitsyistychni pratsi* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 292–297 at p. 296.

²⁸ Among Khmelnytsky's mistakes, Smolii listed the withdrawal of Cossack forces from western Ukraine in late 1648 and the deterioration of Cossack relations with Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania in 1654–55. See Valerii Smolii, 'Het'man Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i ioho doba', in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho (Do 400-richchia vid dnya narodzhennya velykoho het'mana): zbirnyk naukovykh prats'* (Kyiv, 1995), pp. 7–25 at p. 15.

²⁹ Instead, making reference to the writings of a Ukrainian nationalist ideologue, the interwar publicist Dmytro Dontsov, Smolii claims that Ukraine did not unite with Russia into a single state but instead joined a Russo-Ukrainian confederation. See Smolii, 'Het'man Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i ioho doba', pp. 21–22; Valerii Smolii, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina v konteksti ukrains'koho derzhavotvorennya', in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittya: polityka, ideolohiya, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 9–25 at pp. 18–19.

³⁰ See Roman Solchanyk, 'Politics and the National Question in the Post-Shelest Period', in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukraine after Shelest* (Edmonton, 1983), pp. 1–29 at p. 12. For a summary and analysis of Braichevsky's views on the 'reunification' issue see Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, pp. 202–213. For the Ukrainian and English texts of Braichevsky's essay see Mykhailo Braichevsky, *Pryyednannya chy vozz' yednannya?* (Toronto, 1972); Mykhailo Braichevsky, *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception*, translated and edited by George P. Kulchysky (Munich, 1974).

³¹ The term was not officially accepted at that time, but clearly remained attractive in the eyes of leading Ukrainian historians. For the 1960s discussion see Olena Apanovych, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni viiny v epokhu feodalizmu', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1965, 12, pp. 29–38; Ivan Boiko, 'Shche raz pro kharakter natsional'no-vyzvol'nykh voyen v epokhu feodalizmu', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, 2, pp. 84–87.

³² See Valerii Smolii & Valerii Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka natsional'na revolyutsiya XVII st. (1648–1676)* (Kyiv, 1999). On the use of outdated Soviet terminology and concepts by Smolii and Stepankov see Natalya Yakovenko's review of the book, 'V kol'orakh proletars'koï revolyutsii', in *Ukrains'kyi humanitaryi ohlyad*, 2000, 3, pp. 58–78. For a discussion of the term 'revolution' in relation to the Khmelnytsky Uprising see Frank E. Sysyn, 'War der Chmel'nyckyj-Aufstand eine Revolution? Eine Charakteristik der 'grossen ukrainischen Revolte' und der Bildung des Kosakischen Het'manstaates', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 43, 1, 1995, pp. 1–18 (Ukrainian version: 'Chy bulo povstanny a Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho revolyutsiey? Zauvahy do typolohii Khmel'nychchyny', in Bohdan Yakymovych et al. (eds), *Proshonema: Istorychni ta filolohichni rozvidky, prysvyacheni 60-richchyu akademika Yaroslava Isaevycha* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 571–578).

³³ For the latest version of Stepankov's argument on issues of terminology and chronology in the 'Ukrainian national revolution' see his 'Ukrains'ka natsional'na revolyutsiya XVII st.: prychny, typolohiya, khronolohichni i mezhi (dyskusiini notatky)', in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittya*, pp. 26–45. See Sukhyno-Khomenko's remarks in the discussion of 1929 with Yavorsky in *Litopys revolyutsii*, 1930, 5, pp. 322–323, and the chapter on 'The Great Ukrainian Bourgeois Revolution' in Sukhyno-Khomenko, *Odmyny i bankrutstvo ukrains'koho natsionalizmu: istoryko-publitsyistychni i narysy* (Kharkiv, 1929), pp. 28–51.

³⁴ See Mytsyk, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1658 rr.', pp. 30–31.

³⁵ For the use of the term 'war of national liberation' in Tolochko's writings see his 'Pid mistechkom Berestechkom' (1991) and 'Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi' (1995) in his, *Vid Rusi do Ukraïny*, pp. 147–150. A prominent historian of Kyivan Rus' and a well-known political figure, Tolochko remains a strong supporter of independent Ukrainian statehood, but was 'lost' by the dominant Ukrainian elites at the 'nationalisation' stage of the Ukrainian state-building project. Since 1995 he has challenged many aspects of the 'nationalisation' of Ukrainian cultural life and historiography, becoming a villain in the eyes of the Ukrainian historical establishment. For his 'rebellious' ideas see his articles and interviews

of 1995–97, including ‘Imeet li Ukraina natsional’nuyu ideyu?’ ‘Shche raz pro ukrains’ku natsional’nu ideyu’, and ‘Inakomyshlyashchi i Tolochko’, in *Vid Rusi do Ukraïny*, pp. 334–395.

³⁶ See Valerii Smolii, ‘Natsional’no-vyzvol’na viina v kontekst i ukrains’koho derzhavotvorennia’, in *Natsional’no-vyzvol’na viina ukrains’koho narodu*, p. 10.

³⁷ For a portrayal of Khmelnytsky as a state builder first and foremost see, apart from works by Smolii, Stepankov and Mytsyk, the text of the speech delivered by Petro Tolochko at one of the events commemorating the four hundredth anniversary of Khmelnytsky’s birth, ‘Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi’, in Tolochko, *Vid Rusi do Ukraïny*, pp. 147–150.

³⁸ See Smolii, ‘Natsional’no-vyzvolna viina v kontekst i ukrains’koho derzhavotvorennia’, p. 10.

³⁹ The statist approach to the definition of the main goals of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in Ukrainian historiography was criticised by Russian historians at a scholarly conference held in Moscow in January 1995 to commemorate the 340th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council. See Lev Zaborovsky, ‘Rossiisko-ukrainskaya konferentsiya, posvyashchennaya 340-letiyu Pereiaslavskoi rady’, *Otechestvennaya istoriya*, 1995, 5, pp. 217.

⁴⁰ For the use of this term in Ukrainian historiography see Mytsyk, ‘Natsional’no-vyzvol’na viina ukrains’koho narodu 1648–1658 rr.’, p. 30. Cf. Valerii Smolii & Valerii Stepankov, *Ukrains’ka derzhavna ideya: problemy formuvannia, evolyutsii, realizatsii* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 84.

⁴¹ Apparently, the same logic underlay the views of Ukrainian autonomists in the second half of the 18th century. One of them, the Cossack secretary Semen Divovych, represented the Russo-Ukrainian arrangement as a union of two equal partners, Great and Little Russia, under a common tsar. For a discussion of Divovych’s views on the Pereiaslav Agreement see Rudnytsky, ‘Pereiaslav: History and Myth’, p. xvi. For a critique of the view of the Pereiaslav Agreement as an act of confederation see Philip Longworth, ‘Ukraine: History and Nationality’, *Slavonic and East European Review*, 78, 1, January 2000, pp. 115–124 at p. 117.

⁴² See Viktor Zamyatin, ‘Pereiaslavs’ka rada 2: Yakymy povynni buty ukrains’ko-rosiis’ki vzayemyny?’ *Den*, 19 January 1999.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ According to Horobets, at the time of Pereiaslav Muscovy’s boyar regime could not overcome the desire to dictate its will to Ukraine. He expressed his hope that democratic Moscow would prove more far-sighted in this regard. See Viktor Horobets, ‘Ukrains’ko-rosiis’kyi dohovir: vid ratyfikatsii do denonsatsii’, *Den*, 27 March 1999.

⁴⁶ See Valentyn Mohyla, ‘Istoriya ne povynna staty “korolivstvom kryvykh dzerkal”’, *Den*, 24 April 1999.

⁴⁷ See Serhii Makhun, ‘Yak rozirvaty kolo vzayemnoho rakhunku obraz?’ *Den*, 25 December 1999.

⁴⁸ Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry* (Washington DC, 1999), pp. 89–90.